# Purifying the Religion:

## An Analysis of *Haram* Targeting among Salafi Jihadi Groups

*David S. Siroky, Emil Aslan Souleimanov,*
*Jean-François Ratelle, and Milos Popovic*

Following the June 12, 2016 mass shooting at Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida, members of the Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL) publicly celebrated, referring to the carnage—with forty-nine people killed and fifty-three injured, the deadliest terrorist attack on U.S. soil since 9/11 and the deadliest attack against LGBTQ+ people in the U.S.—as "the best Ramadan gift." The group simultaneously issued a new video inviting more lone-wolf attacks across the United States, especially in places where *haram* (i.e., forbidden or proscribed by Islamic law) activities take place.[1] The twin "Sin Cities"—Las Vegas and Macau—are also on the target "wish list" of many Salafi-jihadi groups.[2] On July 19, 2017, ISIS threatened to attack the European Women's Championship football match in Galgenwaard Stadium in Utrecht, causing widespread fear in the oldest religious epicenter of the Netherlands, where over 10 percent of the current inhabitants are Muslims.

While lone-wolf ISIS-inspired attacks have drawn a lot of attention, local jihadi groups often cause even more destruction. For example, Boko Haram-affiliated jihadis attacked a brothel on June 28, 2014, killing ten people in Nigeria's city of Bauchi.[3] Two weeks later, Islamic State-affiliated jihadis in Iraq attacked a brothel in Baghdad, murdering a total of thirty-two people.[4] In addition to clubs and brothels, jihadi groups have attacked other haram targets, such as liquor stores, pre-Islamic statues, mixed-sex schools, tourist resorts, and non-*halal* restaurants. On December 7, 2013, for instance, unidentified Iraqi jihadis targeted liquor stores across the country, killing fifteen people.[5] Boko Haram and Taliban-affiliated jihadi groups in Afghanistan have also frequently used violence against schools offering mixed-sex education as a way of broadcasting their disapproval.[6]

Taliban-affiliated jihadi groups have targeted popular resort areas in Afghanistan, citing "illicit fun," and have made threats to do the same in the West on the grounds

that they are haram.[7] Jihadi groups across the Middle East have also targeted non-halal stores and restaurants that violate Islamic dietary rules with increasing frequency.[8] Asbat al-Ansar, a Salafi-inspired and Al Qaeda-linked terrorist group operating in Lebanon in the mid-1990s, routinely bombed non-halal restaurants and liquor stores, along with nightclubs, theaters, and hostile religious leaders.[9] As early as in the 1980s, Mujama al Islamiya, a vigilante group established by the controversial Sheikh Akhmed Yassin in Gaza, routinely attacked liquor stores, casinos, cinemas, and restaurants selling alcohol.[10]

However, haram targeting is not limited to the Middle East and Africa. In Russia, for example, *Kavkazskii uzel* reported that two bombs exploded in different "illicit" cafés in Khasavyurt, killing seven people in January 2011.[11] On August 4, 2013, another blast occurred in a store selling alcohol in Dagestan's capital city of Makhachkala.[12] One of the most infamous Dagestani jihadi groups, *Jamaat Shariat*, warned business owners that, if they do not stop their haram activities, "we'll set fire to your brothels, blow up places where you do haram, destroy your properties, and shoot at your stores and casinos, … [and] at your saunas, where adultery is practiced."[13]

Despite the attention that such attacks receive in the media, most haram targeting is much less violent, and not all Salafi-jihadi groups engage in haram targeting—indeed, most do not—and that raises a crucial question: Why do some Salafi jihadi groups engage in haram targeting whereas others avoid it? This article suggests that there is a clear logic to haram targeting that can be derived in part from the ethnic structure of Salafi-jihadi groups. Haram-centered violence, we posit, has the important function of uniting ethnically mixed jihadi groups by fostering a superordinate Islamic identity that is necessary for fighters to overcome collective action problems and ethnic divisions. As a result, leaders of ethnically-mixed Salafi jihadi groups are more likely to encourage haram targeting as a means of socializing recruits from distinct ethnic backgrounds into a unified fighting force. The observable empirical implication of this logic is that haram targeting is much more common among ethnically-mixed groups than among homogenous ones.

The article develops and tests this core proposition against alternatives using two original datasets. First, drawing on ethnographic fieldwork along with roughly 200 original interviews, we developed a unique dataset of all jihadi groups and haram attacks (against liquor stores, casinos, and bathhouses) in Dagestan between 2010 and 2014.[14] We draw on original interviews with ex-jihadi combatants in Dagestan, eyewitnesses of haram targeting, and members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the Federal Security Service (FSB) to provide additional insight and context on the logic of haram targeting. Second, we created a cross-national sample covering all Salafi jihadi groups across the globe operating between 1998 and 2015, which enables us to offer the first global assessment of haram targeting.

We selected Russia's peripheral region of Dagestan for an in-depth study of haram targeting because it hosts numerous jihadi groups that have engaged in a large number of haram attacks as well as some that have done so only rarely, or not at all. Compared to many other places in the world, Dagestan witnessed a significant amount of haram targeting, especially in the years 2010–2014, and also exhibits immense internal variation among

the various *jamaats* that can be used to assess the theory. Dagestan is also a multi-ethnic polity, composed of fourteen major ethnic groups and more than thirty local languages, including the Russian language as its *lingua franca*. Since the early 2000s, the republic has faced an upsurge of Islamic insurgent violence, driven largely by local factors.[15] Following Moscow's successful counter-insurgency campaign and the emigration of hundreds of young Salafists to live under the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, the local insurgency has significantly receded.[16] This wave of departures underlined long-lasting religious tensions between the Russian state-sponsored form of Islam and the Salafi communities within Dagestan, often depicted by the government as extremist groups.

As a clan-based society, political and religious groups in Dagestan have to overcome cleavages and engage with multiple identities in order to pursue collective action. After the fall of the Soviet Union, one solution to these challenges was the creation of a consociational model of power-sharing that sought to "manage" ethnic and clan tensions between Avars, Dargins, Laks, Kumyks, and other less numerous ethnicities.[17] Overcoming conflicts and grievances among the republic's main ethnic groups has been one of the main challenges of Dagestan's political system. Similar difficulties can be observed inside insurgent and religious groups, where ethnic and clan-based identities have often conflicted with the need for a common identity among the fighters.

For these reasons, studying haram targeting in Dagestan, especially during this time period, affords an opportunity to leverage original micro-level data for theory-testing. We complement this in-depth analysis with a new disaggregated global dataset on haram attacks among jihadi groups across the entire universe of locations where jihadi groups operated (e.g., Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Nigeria) from 1998 to 2015.[18] This serves to provide a sense of the extent to which the in-depth Dagestan results have external validity.

## Salafi-Jihadi Violence and Haram

In response to the increasing destruction caused by Salafi-jihadi organizations, scholarship on jihadi violence has grown substantially.[19] Whereas there was once a dearth of research, there is now an abundance of studies on different dimensions of Salafi jihadism: the pathways of individual radicalization,[20] motivations to join or exit jihadi groups,[21] the logic of jihadi-based suicide terrorism,[22] as well as the jihadi ideology,[23] networks,[24] financing,[25] and targeting.[26]

Previous research on terrorist targeting suggests that religious ideology shapes the decision to attack "soft targets" (generally understood as undefended objects and civilians),[27] but there is no study addressing the phenomenon of jihadi violence against haram targets, a specific form of soft target that embodies behaviors and goods considered sinful, unlawful, and forbidden according to Salafi ideology and doctrine.[28] While there are many anecdotes and newspaper articles about haram attacks, to the best of our knowledge there has not yet been a systematic analysis of haram attacks among Salafi jihadi groups, either in one region or globally.

The Salafi movement has haram targeting—including by violent means—engrained in its origins, and it emerged as such to cleanse the religion of everything inconsistent with its understanding of the Islamic dogma.[29] It calls for a strict and literal reading of Muslim holy texts.[30] Theologically, Salafis advocate the closest observance of monotheism (*tawhid*). Proponents of the Salafi doctrine refer to themselves as believers in the unity of god (*muwahhidun*) and refuse to acknowledge any other source of identity (e.g., ethnicity, class, tribe, and race) than their religious identity as part of the global *umma* (the community of fellow Muslim believers). Proponents of Salafi-jihadism call for the establishment (or revival of the state from the late Mohammad era and its successors) of an Islamic theocracy based on Islamic law (*shariah*) and emphasize the fight against infidels (*kuffar*), hypocrites (*munafiqun*), and apostates (*murtaddun*). In order to purify Islam and return it to the path of their righteous forefathers (*as-salaf as-salih,* hence the term "Salafism"), Muslims have to put an end to pre-Islamic practices (*jahiliyya*) as well as later innovations in Islam (*bid'a*). Most famously, Salafi-jihadis have emphasized the need for a "holy war" or struggle (*jihad*), which specifically targets anyone and anything that is considered haram.[31]

As a puritanical branch of Sunni Islam, Salafism is notorious for its uncompromising stance towards haram*,* especially compared to the more relaxed attitudes of other interpretations of Sunni Islam. Islamic tradition invokes the term haram to describe the unlawful, immoral, and forbidden practices stipulated in the Quran and in the *Sunnah*.[32] These practices include, but are not limited to, adultery, premarital sex, mixed-sex communication (unless between close relatives), gambling, homosexuality, and prostitution. They also prohibit the consumption of pork and alcohol, or any non-halal food. In addition to these practices uniformly deemed haram according to most Islamic scholars, Salafi doctrine also outlaws tobacco, music, dancing, singing, and other forms of "illicit fun."[33]

In other words, the Islamic juridical framework recognizes degrees of haram, and this shapes both how jihadis and broader society perceive these acts. Some behaviors and acts are considered *makrooh* (disliked by God), whereas others are considered explicitly haram (forbidden by God). Most Muslims categorize smoking, for example, as makrooh rather than haram. Within the haram category, these acts can be divided into major sins (*kabira*) and minor sins (*saghira*), and these can be further divided between those acts that hurt only the individual who is doing them (*zatihi*) versus haram acts that hurt all of society (*ghairihi*). These distinctions are not merely theoretical, but can have a tangible impact on how the haram act is perceived by its audience, and on its utility for the perpetrators of haram violence. While it is important to understand the full scope of the concept of haram*,* it is equally crucial to point out that it is understood differently by various Salafi-jihadi groups across cultural contexts. In Dagestani jamaats, haram is primarily centered around alcohol consumption, which represents a critical social problem, whereas in other regions jihadis are focused on purifying the religion from other pressing issues.

Given the centrality of haram to Salafi ideology, and yet the massive variation in the extent to which haram targeting is used, it seems clear that a careful examination of the extent to which the various Salafi jihadi groups around the world engage in haram targeting

is warranted. This study investigates why some jihadi groups use violence against places, people, and practices deemed haram, whereas other jihadi groups refrain from it.

## Related Literature and Theory

Martin writes, "Terrorists select their targets because of their symbolic and propaganda value. High-profile, sentimental, or otherwise significant targets are chosen with the expectation that the target's constituency will be moved, and that the victims' audience will in some way suffer."[34] Examples include embassies and diplomatic personnel, international symbols, symbolic buildings and sites, emblematic people, and personnel carriers.[35] In general, experts on terrorism suggest that terrorist targets are selected to "inform, educate, and ultimately rally the people behind the revolution."[36]

Building on this work, other scholars have focused on the ideologies of terrorist groups and how they shape their perception of enemies, while also determining who or what is considered a legitimate target.[37] Asal et al. examine the role of ideology in target selection—specifically, religious ideology—and focuses on civilian targeting.[38] Religious terrorism is distinct from other kinds of terrorism because it emphasizes divine punishment and redemption,[39] so targets are selected because they represent "the forces of evil." Juergensmeyer links religious violence to the targeting of "evil" civilians, objects and practices.[40] Salafi jihadis, like other religious fundamentalists, appeal to a godly rather than to a worldly judge to legitimize their target selection.[41] While religious ideology fuels haram targeting, and haram is an explicitly religious concept central to Salafi jihadism, it is also not the whole story, since we clearly observe variation in haram targeting among Salafi jihadi groups that share the same ideology. If more religiously oriented jihadis were more likely to engage in more haram targeting, and also more attracted to ethnically-mixed jamaats, it might be difficult to disentangle these reasons. While we cannot think of a reason why more religiously oriented jihadists would be disproportionately drawn to ethnically-mixed jamaats, we do know that, in Dagestan, some of the most religiously fundamentalist (purist) groups were mono-ethnic rather than mixed-ethnic jamaats, and further that these groups largely refrained from haram attacks.[42] Purist rural jamaats led by Salafi-jihadi icons were, if anything, more likely to attract religious fundamentalists. Although religious ideology is clearly important, if it were the whole story behind target selection, haram targeting would be far more widespread than it is among Salafi jihadi groups.[43]

In practice, haram-targeted violence is rare (and typically not as brutal as the events that have captured headlines), and usually too limited in scope and intensity to defeat the opponent outright and generate substantial political change.[44] Instead, haram targets operate as largely non-verbal messages; like other forms of terrorism, the power of haram targeting is primarily psychological and sociological.[45] It both serves to send a signal to the local population and, at the same, to cohere a group of fighters from different ethnicities around a central religious objective, fostering group solidarity that will help them overcome collective action problems.

One might wonder whether the reason some groups engage in more haram targeting is that they cannot control, monitor, or sanction their rank-and-file members well. This "organizational control" approach has been used successfully to understand the use of violence and civilian targeting,[46] and could be applied to understanding and explaining variation in haram targeting. Abrahms and Potter, for example, argue that decentralized groups face more principal-agent problems in which the rank-and-file fighters that are subordinated to weak leaders are more likely to target civilians.[47] By this logic, targeting decisions often come from the bottom-up, sometimes in defiance of the leaders' preferences. There is, however, an important distinction between the logic of civilian targeting, which is usually a mix of strategy and pillaging, and haram targeting, which is almost always an intentional strategy with a very specific religious message, and rarely the result of recklessness or "bad apple" soldiers. Moreover, haram attacks are rare, especially compared to civilian victimization, which occurs in nearly all civil wars. Haram targeting is, of course, also limited to civil wars with Muslim combatants. Further, even among such conflicts, it is restricted to those with a Salafi-Jihadi ideology, which is a minority, and only a fraction of Salafi jihadi groups actually engage in haram targeting.

Ethnographic research with former Dagestani jihadi also indicates that the *amirs* (commanders) of jamaats were the principal decision-makers. According to an ex-jihadi, ordinary jihadis were usually treated as "infantry [*soldaty*], with the leadership [*nachal'stvo*] making decisions about what to do, how to do, who to kill and ally yourself with […] how to make or spend money. Our role was auxiliary [*vspomogatel'nyi*]."[48] Akhmet Yarlykapov, a reputed Russian-Dagestani anthropologist and an expert on the regional insurgency, observed this pattern across the North Caucasus jihadi groups and elsewhere. According to Yarlykapov, ordinary jihadists in Dagestan were subject to all sorts of manipulation and rarely in charge of anything beyond fulfilling tasks ascribed to them by the jamaat leadership: "matters of importance were concentrated in the hands of *amirs*."[49] The leadership of jihadi groups decided to socialize recruits using haram targeting, mostly in ethnically diverse jamaats.[50] In short, low-level members in jihadi groups did determine whether or which haram targets to attack.

Rather than religious infusion per se or principal-agent problems,[51] this article suggests that the ethnic composition of jihadi groups influenced their likelihood of using of haram attacks. We hypothesize that ethnically mixed jihadi groups are more likely to engage in haram attacks because a critical function of haram targeting is to help overcome conflicting ethnic and clan-based loyalties in mixed Salafi-jihadi groups, which can impede collective action in the future (for instance, if members are unwilling to hit targets where their ethnic kin reside). This is particularly true in a multi-ethnic setting.[52] By confronting a common enemy, we argue that leaders in jihadi groups sought to overcome the more parochial identities of their members and create a greater group solidarity. As a cohesion-building exercise, haram targeting, therefore, focused on what united the different ethnicities—Islam and the umma—rather than on what divided them.

Attacking haram sites can help cement the group by providing a sense of godly purpose, fostering solidarity among members, and unifying recruits from different ethnic groups. Among the various opportunities for violence, haram targets foster a

superordinate religious identity that transcends ethnicity while serving as a bonding experience for young fighters. Through these mechanisms, haram targeting can help to overcome collective action problems that are frequently greater in more diverse groups. For these reasons, we surmise, haram targeting is more often used as a strategy by the leadership of multi-ethnic jamaats.[53] Consistent with this logic, we hypothesize that:

> $H_1$: Multi-ethnic Salafi jihadi groups will be more likely than mono-ethnic ones to use haram targeting.

In the next section, we examine this proposition using new data and interviews from ethnographic research in Dagestan; after that, we use a new disaggregated global dataset to assess its external validity.

## Data and Methods

Using new data on all known incidents of haram-centered violence over a fifty-month period, from May 17, 2010 to July 27, 2014 in Dagestan, we systematically examine the role of ethnic diversity in jihadi groups in haram targeting. We select 2010 as the start date because it coincides with the date when *Jamaat Shariat*,[54] Dagestan's largest jihadi network, began disseminating leaflets across the republic, declaring war on those involved in "seeding spoiled morals and multiplying sins."[55] During this fifty-month period, we identified forty-one distinct haram attacks (out of a total of 386 terrorist attacks in total),[56] and approximately thirty-six unique Salafi-jihadi groups and sub-groups. Each incident was verified in two Russian-speaking trackers of jihadi activities in Dagestan: *The Caucasian Knot* (*Kavkazskii Uzel*)*,* an Internet news portal specializing in the Caucasus, and *Chernovik*, a Dagestani daily. After identifying all mentioned events, we further validated them through other media outlets (*Dagestanskaya Pravda*, *RIA Dagestan*, and *Makhachkalinskie izvestiya*), together with Dagestan-based jihadi groups' websites, such as *vdagestan.com*, *ummanews.com*, and *kavkazcenter.com,* to confirm the haram attack and to fill in any available details.

In addition, we also draw on numerous interviews conducted over the last ten-year period with ordinary Dagestanis living in both rural and urban areas where insurgent groups have operated. Our interviews cover a broad set of demographic groups inside Dagestan, including Soviet and post-Soviet educated Dagestanis, men and women, and various social classes (e.g., intelligentsia, religious figures, businessmen, human rights workers, journalists, manual workers, farmers, and retirees). Each interview lasted between thirty minutes and two hours and focused on the causes and dynamics of insurgent violence in Dagestan, as well as ethnicity and religion. Regarding the identification of the perpetrators, we asked at least two informants from different groups to independently code each attack and its perpetrator.[57]

In the period from February to June 2017, we conducted an additional series of twenty follow-up interviews with our informants using various internet-based communication

channels (WhatsApp, Skype, Signal, Viber, etc.). The bulk of these interviews were conducted with former jihadis from Dagestan; a minority was conducted with current jihadis from Dagestan. Experts on jihadi violence in Dagestan, including local journalists, scholars, politicians, and officers of the Dagestani Ministry of Interior and the Federal Security Service, were also consulted. Interviews with former and current jihadis were conducted both inside and outside Dagestan in Istanbul, Tbilisi, and Prague, where multiple ex-combatants now live.[58] Interviews were conducted in most major Dagestani cities (including Makhachkala, Kaspiysk, Derbent, Khasavyurt, Izberbash, and Buynaksk) as well as in rural areas where insurgents were active (such as Karabudakhkentsky, Gergebilsky, Gunibsky, Levashinsky, Shamilsky, Tabasaransky, and Untsukulsky districts).

To the best of our knowledge, the final dataset of haram attacks in Dagestan is the most complete and accurate set of haram terrorist incidents in a single region, validated by multiple independent sources, and with relatively detailed information regarding attacks, the perpetrators of violence, and the characteristics of each jamaat.

## Ethnicity and the Logic of Haram Targeting in Dagestan

Dagestan's rural jihadi groups largely operate on a territorial-clan (*tukhum*) basis.[59] Given the salience of tukhum-based kinship in the republic's rural areas, authorities and law enforcement are often manned by the members of the same family (or clan) as the members of locally operating jihadi groups.[60] Endogamy, pervasive in Dagestan's rural areas, reinforces these clan and ethnic loyalties. With Dagestan's ethnic groups numbering from a few thousand to several hundred thousand members, many co-ethnics are close or distant relatives. Moreover, against the backdrop of Dagestan's highly ethnically fractionalized society, ethnicity serves as the principal source of self-identification, with its relevance stretching well beyond established kinship ties. In their quotidian lives, individuals place enormous importance on ethnicity in general, and ethnic solidarity in particular: marriage, communal life, employment, and politics all revolve around the notion of ethnicity-centered in-group solidarity.[61] As many Dagestanis have confessed, ethnicity is seen as an extended family mainly because in the not-too-distant past, members of the republic's ethnic groups were all relatives.[62]

Ethnicity has retained its significance even among regional jihadi groups, both in Dagestan and across the multiethnic North Caucasus.[63] Some jamaats are dominated by Avars and others by Kumyks, Laks, Dargins, and Lezgins, whereas other jamaats are ethnically mixed. While targeting relatives is considered taboo in Dagestani society, killing a co-ethnic, although less extreme, is also frowned upon, due to the widespread view in Dagestan of ethnic groups as a form of extended kinship. This attitude, while pervasive throughout Dagestan, is particularly strong in the more rural areas where ethnicity is most closely interwoven with kinship and most, though certainly not all, jamaats tend to be monoethnic.

Rural and mono-ethnic jamaats do sometimes target military, civilian, and other soft targets outside of their areas of operations, including in major cities and other rural areas, but compared to urban multi-ethnic jamaats, rural mono-ethnic jamaats tended

to strike against haram targets less frequently, even when they had the capacity and opportunity to do so. Although haram businesses are more widespread in urban areas, it is important to appreciate that they also exist in rural areas and are typically even easier to attack compared to urban areas since there is less security. Yet, as an empirical matter, mono-ethnic jamaats almost never attacked haram targets in their own rural areas. An insurgent supporter from a remote village in mountainous Dagestan explained how local haram is mostly addressed:

> In villages like this one, everyone knows everyone. Forest brothers don't need to target "bad" Muslims; we ensure that fellow villagers respect Islam, their families, and themselves. We know who smokes, drinks, or gambles. If they want to engage in sinful behaviors, they can leave and live in Makhachkala. If not, we can take care of them. They would not dare do that in public here![64]

By contrast, multi-ethnic jamaats do engage in a significant amount of haram targeting in their own backyard (mostly in cities) and (to a lesser extent, for some of the reasons just mentioned) in rural areas. This further underscores that the dynamics we describe in Dagestan are not as much attributable to the greater density of haram targets in urban areas, or to other urban-rural differences, so much as they are to the ethnic composition of the jamaat itself and to the leadership's decision in ethnically-mixed jamaats to select haram targets.

In our dataset, we identified thirty-six insurgent groups active in Dagestan during the period of our study, including twelve mono-ethnic groups[65] and twenty-four multi-ethnic[66] groups. From that population, we identified twenty-four jamaats that engaged in haram attacks (five were mono-ethnic and nineteen multi-ethnic). Even accounting for the fact that there are twice as many multi-ethnic jamaats as mono-ethnic ones in Dagestan (twenty-four versus twelve), multi-ethnic jamaats have carried out nearly four times as many attacks as mono-ethnic groups (thirty-three versus nine over the fifty-month period, or 6.6 versus 1.8 attacks per year).

One of the key reasons for this disparity seems to be that the leaders of multiethnic urban jamaats were concerned with the need to overcome the strong ethnic identities among group members by fostering a uniform Salafi-jihadi identity. As one former jihadi observed, "disputes have often been conditioned by [ethnic] nationalism,"[67] so ethnically-mixed jamaats appear to have been more exposed to top-down Salafi-jihadi indoctrination for the sake of transcending dangerous ethnic divisions.[68] Attacking targets commonly identified as un-Islamic (e.g., haram) serves as one of the main ways jihadi groups overcome parochial identities for the sake of fighting a common "evil" enemy.

Some interviewees underlined how acting against what they perceived as "spoiled morals" and "anti-Islamic" behaviors helped to unite fighters of different ethnic backgrounds. "Ethnicity [*natsional'nost'*] doesn't matter," explained one insurgent supporter, "Islam does. Targeting *them* unites *us* together."[69] As summarized by a former jihadi, "What is against Islam is the enemy of us, Muslims. No matter whether you're an Avar, Dargin, or Lak […] we have to fight against the evil [*kufr* and haram]. It all brings us together. This is the beauty of it."[70] At the same time, as emphasized by a former member of an ethnically-mixed jamaat, "the good thing" about attacking haram businesses

(without casualties) was that "you would avoid [ordinary] people hating you because you specifically targeted a group of, say, Avars."[71]

These small-scale and usually non-lethal attacks helped ethnically fragmented jamaats become more cohesive, while avoiding lethal violence, necessarily aimed against members of some of the republic's ethnic communities. Overcoming ethnic bias and cementing group cohesion using the common goal of fighting evil is a central theme in haram targeting. A leading figure of a formerly urban jamaat acknowledged:

> If you are a Rutul [member of a small Dagestani ethnic group], you're somewhat inclined to avoid targeting business run by another Rutul: the likelihood of them being members of your tukhum [clan] is higher. You would rather prefer targeting someone else. An Avar-run business, for example, but even if you target one of your own … at least the business is the target, and no one is killed.[72]

Another former jihadist admitted that as an uncontroversial and non-lethal form of violence, haram targeting fostered group cohesion in that it inserted a sense of divine purpose into individual jihadis who "felt we did what was needed to be done on the path of Allah."[73]After each incident of haram targeting, as one former jihadist put it, foot soldiers "felt friendlier [*druzhnee*] toward each other,"[74] underscoring the role of haram targeting as an instrument of cementing group cohesion and religiously-imbued group solidarity. Multi-ethnic jamaats leaders often specifically selected haram targets from one of the key groups to break clan ties and reinforce the jihadi loyalties.

As a former jihadi recollected, "when you carry out your first ever task, and you're successful, it boosts your self-confidence incredibly. You get convinced that you're on the right [religious] path and that you're the right man."[75] The "religious high" here is just as important (especially for new recruits) as group cohesion is to leaders. In many interviews, individuals underlined how acting against what they perceived as "spoiled morals" and "anti-Islamic" behaviors helped to unite fighters from different ethnic groups inside Dagestan. "Carrying out my first attack showed me the righteous path and confirmed my bond with fellow brothers and what I knew about *Pure Islam*. … Islam transcends everything in life."[76]

While former insurgents and their supporters agree in principle that Islam is superior to, and should take precedence over, clan and ethnic loyalties, the reality on the ground is often different from the established rhetoric. Ethnic favoritism (*asabiyya*) is a widely recognized problem in multiethnic Dagestan,[77] and it has also pervaded the republic's jihadi groups, with leaders of multiethnic jamaats preferring the recruitment of their ethnic kin or relegating important positions within their jamaats to their ethnic kin as means of ensuring loyalty. This, too, has caused tension within jamaats, with members of disadvantaged ethnic groups expressing grievances over discriminatory, un-Islamic practices. In 2010, an Islamic judge of Dagestan's largest jamaat Shariat even issued an internal *fatwa* calling the leader of a minor jamaat, operating in the Khasavyurt area, to abandon ethnic favoritism or leave the jihad entirely.[78] In short, ethnic favoritism and bias in ethnically-mixed jamaats are serious issues that the leaders need to overcome if they are to be successful, and haram targeting is one clear and often effective means to achieve trans-ethnic group cohesion.[79]

The ethnically-mixed Makhachkala and Derbent jamaats sought to overcome identity-based cleavages through haram targeting in order to create a sense of cohesion. It appears that the leaders saw haram targeting as a rather non-controversial means of fostering supra-ethnic religious solidarity and group cohesion and often deployed it as a form of initiation violence to integrate new and inexperienced recruits.[80] By contrast, the Gubden jamaat was a mono-ethnic group well-known for its terrorist and insurgent activities. Its members were known for their religious fervor and their dedication for what they called "Pure Islam."[81] Although they regularly targeted security forces linked to "anti-Wahhabist" activists and "moderate" clerics in Dagestan and in other parts of Russia (e.g., the 2010 Moscow Metro bombings), the mono-ethnic Gubden jamaat never once engaged in any haram targeting.[82]

We observe these same patterns at large in the quantitative data. First, in absolute terms, multi-ethnic groups launched more haram attacks than mono-ethnic outfits: five of the twelve mono-ethnic jamaats (41 percent) engaged in a total of nine haram attacks, whereas nineteen out of twenty-four multi-ethnic jamaats (79 percent) carried out a total of thirty-three attacks. Mono-ethnic jamaats in Dagestan were responsible for only 21 percent of all haram attacks (nine out of forty-two), while multi-ethnic jamaats conducted the remaining 79 percent (thirty-three out of forty-two).

Figure 1 shows that multi-ethnic jamaats also engaged in significantly more frequent attacks (1.4) than homogeneous ethnic jamaats (0.8). Consistent with our ethnographic evidence, we find that ethnically-mixed jamaats carried out the bulk of their attacks on businesses selling liquor (convenience stores, restaurants, supermarkets, grocery stores, pubs, and pharmacies). Multi-ethnic jamaats carried out most of the haram targeting and did so mostly in urban areas,[83] since those targets were closest, although they did occasionally attack haram targets in rural areas (e.g., Shamkhal, Novy Sulak, Ashaga Stal, Aknada, and Stalskoe). As a member of multi-ethnic urban jamaat told us, "we will hit the sinners wherever they are … even if they are hiding outside of the city. We have resources for that. Sinners can only understand bombs and fear."[84]

Since multi-ethnic jamaats are more likely to operate in city environments, they are much closer to haram targets (because there are more haram targets in cities than in villages), and this could partly explain why multi-ethnic jamaats are more likely to engage in haram targeting. While it is true that multi-ethnic groups are more likely to operate in cities and that haram is more prevalent in urban areas, a few caveats are in order. First, mono-ethnic village-based jamaats sometimes did hit targets outside of their direct vicinities, including in major cities, so the assumption that jamaats *only* hit targets in their vicinity is dubious (e.g., the Gudben jamaat as well as the Endireyskaya jamaat). Conversely, urban jamaats sometimes targeted rural haram objects. In short, the jihadi groups' proximity to more haram objects did not directly correlate with the location of their targeting, since jamaats often engaged in haram targeting outside the areas in which they resided. To determine whether these results were driven by urban versus rural jamaat differences, we conducted a t-test for difference in means. While urban jamaats engaged in more haram attacks than their rural counterparts, this difference was not statistically significant ($t = 1.4$, p-value = 0.17). Another way to look into this issue is to examine only urban jamaats. When

**Figure 1**   Haram Attacks in Dagestan by Ethnic Homogeneity of Jamaat



limiting the sample to urban jamaats, there is still significant variation in haram targeting, which is due largely to their ethnic structure. While the urban-rural cleavage is important to take into account here and elsewhere, it does not change our main results or conclusions.

We also considered the possibility that a higher frequency of haram targeting by ethnically-mixed jamaats was due to attracting more religious fundamentalists to their ranks. Religious fundamentalists were, if anything, more attracted to groups led by jihadi icons, which most often headed mono-ethnic jamaats in rural areas.[85] For example, the head of the mono-ethnic rural Gubden Jamaat, Ibrahimhalil Daudov, was considered one of the leaders of Dagestani jihadism. A "founding co-father" of the jihadist "Caucasus Emirate" across the North Caucasus in 2007, he became the head of the all-Dagestani "Jamaat Shariat" in 2010. During its existence, the Gubden Jamaat carried out only a single attack against haram objects (and none while being under Daudov's command). It was dozens of non-haram but brazen-faced attacks across the republic that made the group infamous and attracted many religious fundamentalists. Similarly, the leader of the mono-ethnic Levashinskiy jamaat, Rappani Khalilov, was considered an important jihadi ideologue and attracted religiously-motivated recruits, but this group avoided violence against haram targets altogether. In spite of harboring religious fundamentalist

members and even leaders, these largely mono-ethnic jamaats generally avoided haram targeting and pursued other targets and objectives.

In short, these findings show that ethnically-heterogeneous jihadi groups engage more than homogeneous ones in haram attacks. The qualitative evidence indicates that ethnically-mixed jamaats did so primarily for the purpose of creating a common purpose, overcoming ethnic and tribal cleavages, especially among new recruits, and fostering a more unified fighting force capable of engaging in risky collective action.

## Global Data on Haram Attacks

To assess the argument's potential external validity and broader applicability, we created a new global cross-national dataset of all haram attacks from 1998 to 2015. Drawing on background information from Jones (2018), Big, Allied and Dangerous (BAAD), and Crenshaw (2013), we identify 113 out of 167 (67 percent) Islamist groups that can be classified as Salafi (or Deobandi).[86] Of these 113, we find that thirty-six of them (or 32 percent) carried out one or more haram attacks during the observed period, for a total of 196 distinct haram attacks.[87]

To maximize comparability, we coded the ethnic composition of groups for the global data in the same way as we did for Dagestan.[88] Jihadi groups with two or more main ethnic groups were coded as mixed, while those with more than half of its members belonging to a single ethnic group were coded as homogenous.[89] In total, we identified sixty-one ethnically-homogeneous groups (53 percent), forty-nine ethnically-mixed ones (43 percent), and four that we could not discern clearly (4 percent).

Figure 2 shows displays these new global data and shows that haram attacks are much more common among ethnically-mixed than among ethnically-homogeneous jihadi groups. Ethnically-mixed groups were a minority of the Salafi jihadi groups, but carried out two-thirds of all haram attacks (66 percent). Of the sixty-one ethnically homogenous groups, eleven engaged in haram attacks (18 percent), compared to twenty-five of the forty-nine ethnically-mixed groups (51 percent). Finally, the average mixed group carried out more than twice as many attacks (2.6) than the average homogenous group (1.1).

The two most active groups in the global dataset, the Taliban and Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP), appear to illustrate this pattern. While both the Taliban and TTP share many similarities, including their cooperation and disdain for girls' schooling, they have different ethnic structures, thereby offering a useful way to examine the core hypothesis. The Taliban is largely composed of ethnic Pashtun tribes,[90] while the TTP is comprised of dozens of tribal factions as well as Arabs, Uzbeks, Afghans, Chechens, and Punjabis.[91] Assuming an equal number of targets, our theory suggests that the TTP should conduct more attacks against haram targets than the Taliban, as an intentional means of building solidarity and cohesion across ethnically distinct and sometime divided members. The data indeed show that TTP launched seventy-nine haram attacks, whereas the Taliban launched "only" forty-seven.[92]

Needless to say, taking into account rebel group characteristics aside from its ethnic composition is critical. There is some evidence that older groups become deadlier

**Figure 2**   Ethnic Homogeneity and *Haram* Attacks, Global Sample (including the Dagestan sample)



through learning and adaptation to counterterrorism, acquiring more specialized skills as they mature.[93] To account for this possibility, the model estimation controls for the age of jihadi groups.[94] Strength is another factor: some studies have found that weaker militant groups are more prone to target civilians due to a lack of incentives or resources to provide services to the local population,[95] while others find that stronger groups are more violent.[96] Although haram attacks are not aimed against civilians, weaker groups might utilize them to show that they are more radical than their competitors in anticipation that such spectacular attacks would attract new members.[97] Recent research suggests that Salafi-jihadist groups are also likely to modify their target selection in response to competition from other groups with similar ideology.[98] If this view holds, then weaker militants should be more likely to engage in haram attacks.[99] However, a different alternative mechanism suggests that more experienced militant groups are more versed in haram attacks.

We thus model the occurrence of haram attacks as a function of three covariates with a logistic regression estimator: group ethnic composition, group strength, and group age. We also account for the fact that some groups originate from the same country by

**Figure 3**  Main Model of *Haram* Attacks with Marginal Effects



Note: (Top) Full Model of *Haram* Attacks on global sample with mean point estimates and 90% confidence intervals (thick horizontal line) and 95% confidence intervals (thin horizontal line). Robust standard errors are clustered on the state level. The model includes country fixed-effects, which are not shown here. The vertical dashed line is the line of "no effect". The number of observations (Salafi groups) is 114. (Bottom) Marginal effects of ethnically mixed Salafi groups on *haram* attacks of model under (a).

clustering the robust standard errors at the state level and include country fixed effects to account for unobserved cross-national heterogeneity.

Consistent with the theoretical expectations, and reinforcing the findings from our analysis of data from Dagestan, Figure 3 (top) shows that ethnically-mixed groups are

positively associated with a significantly higher probability of engaging in haram attacks. It also shows that rebel capabilities and group age have no statistically significant effect on the likelihood of haram attacks, casting doubt on two possible alternative explanations while reinforcing the plausibility of the main result. Figure 3 (bottom) displays the predicted probability of a jihadi group conducting any haram attacks, separately for mixed and homogeneous groups, and shows that ethnically mixed Salafi outfits were more than twice as likely to conduct haram attacks compared to mono-ethnic ones.

## Conclusion

Jihadi attacks against haram targets have made headlines around the world. As Salafi-jihadi groups arise in more and more theatres of conflict, a better understanding of the strategic and tactical choices behind this form of violence is warranted.

   This article examines patterns of haram targeting using original empirical material gathered from Dagestan and a new global dataset that we compiled on haram attacks. In the Dagestan analysis, we relied on dozens of original interviews with ex-combatant jihadis, government officials, and eyewitnesses to assess the core hypothesis both quantitatively and qualitatively. Despite adhering to a uniform Salafi-jihadi dogma and rhetoric, not all Salafi jihadi groups engage in haram targeting. It is mostly a phenomenon that ethnically-mixed jihadi groups practice, and we conjecture that leaders of mixed groups utilize it primarily for overcoming internal parochial divisions based on ethnicity, tribe, and clan by fostering a superordinate identity based on the common purpose of purifying the religion from everything un-Islamic. In a clan-based society like Dagestan, and in some parts of the Middle East, haram targeting serves as a ritual of initiation carried out to cement loyalty among new recruits, to overcome parochial and ethnic affiliation, and to increase the jamaat's cohesion. Usually non-lethal attacks against explicitly un-Islamic targets help to boost the sense of divine purpose among newly recruited jihadis without creating a backlash among the local population.

   Scholars have shown that sexual violence can create cohesion in rebel groups by separating individuals who violate such taboos from their former lives, making it harder for them to leave and reintegrate.[100] Among Salafi-jihadi groups, and particularly among more ethnically-mixed jihadi groups, haram targeting serves a similar but in some ways more central social function, since it is tied to the group's ideology in a way that sexual violence usually is not. It also cuts off members from their old lives, like other violence, but it does not do so by engaging in taboo behavior. Its behavior is explicitly sanctioned by the religious ideology. Moreover, it unites different ethnic groups within the umma, thereby reinforcing their decision to focus on their religious identity (and subordinate, to some extent, their ethnic identity) with a sense of divine sanctioning for punishing the sinful and creating a more Islamic society. While it is certainly not the only reason for haram targeting, we find a consistent pattern in Dagestan and at the global level, which we hope provides a solid starting point for advancing our understanding of haram targeting in the future.

We have suggested that haram targeting is particularly enticing for ethnically-mixed jamaats, for it represents a method to increase internal cohesion and boost external reputation without incurring high costs from the local population or potential retaliation from ethnically or kinship-related security forces. Yet it is important to note that the tendency of multi-ethnic jamaats to engage in more haram attacks is only the tip of this research frontier. Much progress has been made in our understanding of religious terrorism in general, and we hope to have contributed to it further through this original study of haram targeting, though much remains to be done to better understand its logic across different strategic settings. Further research is required, for instance, to better understand the role of the control-collaboration model in civil war as well as whether and how membership in international jihadist networks influences the use of haram-based violence.

# NOTES

1. Ben Hubbard, "ISIS Uses Ramadan as Calling for New Terrorist Attacks," *New York Times*, Jul. 3, 2016. Lone-wolf homegrown ISIS-inspired attacks are different than the group-based attacks examined here.

2. The terms Salafi-jihadi and jihadi are used interchangeably in this article.

3. Robert Spencer, "Nigeria: Islamic Jihadists Murder 10 and Injure 10 More with Bomb Blast at Brothel," *Jihadi Watch*, Jun. 28, 2014.

4. "Iraqi Jihadists Slaughter 32 at Baghdad Brothel," *No More Cocktails,* Jul. 14, 2014.

5. Robert Spencer, "Sharia in Action in Iraq: Islamic Supremacists Attack Liquor Stores, Murdering 15 People," *Jihadi Watch*, Dec. 7, 2013.

6. Global Coalition to Protect Education from Attack (GCPEA), Country Profiles: Afghanistan (New York City: GCPEA, 2015).

7. Tom A. Peter, "Taliban Attack Kabul Resort, Citing 'Illicit Fun' and Alcohol," *Christian Science Monitor*, Jun. 22, 2012.

8. Katharina Von Knop, "The Female Jihad: Al Qaeda's Women," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 30 (March 2007), 397–414.

9. Country reports on terrorism 2004, U.S. Department of State: Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (Washington, D.C., April 2005), 95.

10. Beverley Milton-Edwards, *Islamic Politics in Palestine* (London: IB Tauris, 1999): 115.

11. "Explosion in Khasavyurt is Qualified as an Act of Terror," *Kavkazskiy uzel*, Jan. 27, 2011, http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/15938/, accessed March 24, 2017; "Three Persons Lost in Explosion in Khasavyurt," *Kavkazskiy uzel*, Jan.15, 2011, http://www.eng.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/15871/, accessed March 24, 2017. The majority of the attacks against *haram* targets in the North Caucasus happened between 2010 and 2014 in Dagestan.

12. "Dvachelovekago spitalizirovany v Makhachkaleposlevzryva v gastronome '24 chasa'," *Kavkazskiyuzel*, Aug, 5, 2013, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.eu/articles/228133/, accessed March 24, 2017; "Twin Bomb Blasts Rip through Two Shops in Dagestan," *Euronews*, Oct. 31, 2013, http://www.euronews.com/2013/10/31/twin-bomb-blasts-rip-through-two-shops-in-dagestan, accessed March 24, 2017.

13. "V Dagestane rasprostranayutsa listovki s ugrozami v adres torgovtsev alkogolem i narkotikami," *Kavkazskiy Uzel*, May 18, 2010, http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/168958/, accessed July 11, 2013.

14. Bathhouses (saunas) are commonly considered brothels due to the proliferation of sexual service.

15. These include corruption and clan competition for local resources, human rights abuses, religious repression, economic decline and the spillover effects of the Chechen conflicts. Campana Aurélie and Jean-François Ratelle, "A Political Sociology Approach to the Diffusion of Conflict from Chechnya to Dagestan and Ingushetia," *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 37 (January 2014), 115–34; Jean-François Ratelle and Emil Aslan Souleimanov, "Retaliation in Rebellion: The Missing Link to Explaining Insurgent Violence in Dages-

tan," *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 29 (March 2017), 573–92; Emil Aslan Souleimanov and David Siroky, "Random or Retributive?," *World Politics,* 68 (September 2016), 677–12; David Siroky and Valery Dzutsati, "The Empire Strikes Back: Ethnicity, Terrain, and Indiscriminate Violence in Counterinsurgencies," *Social Science Quarterly*, 96 (September 2016), 807–29; Domitilla Sagramoso, "The Radicalisation of Islamic Salafi Jamaats in the North Caucasus," *Europe-Asia Studies*, 64 (April 2012), 561–95; Marya Rozanova and Akhmet Yarlykapov, "The Islamic Religion and Cultural Diversity in Contemporary Russia: Case Study of North Caucasus Region, Dagestan," *OMNES: The Journal of Multicultural Society,* 5 (2014), 22–47.

16. Jean-François Ratelle, "North Caucasian Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq: Assessing the Threat of Returnees to the Russian Federation," *Caucasus Survey,* 4 (2016), 218–38.

17. Robert Bruce Ware and Enver Kisriev, "Ethnic Parity and Democratic Pluralism in Dagestan: A Consociational Approach," *Europe-Asia Studies,* 53 (2001), 105–31.

18. See Appendix. Due to space constraints, the Appendix is not in the print version of this article. It can be viewed in the online version, at https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/cuny/cp.

19. On jihadi organizations and radical Islamic movements, see Faisal Devji, *Landscapes of Jihad: Militancy, Morality and Modernity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005); Mary Habeck, *Knowing the Enemy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006); Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2005); Bassam Tibi, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002); Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).

20. Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko, "Mechanisms of Political Radicalization: Pathways Toward Terrorism," *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 20 (2008), 415–33.

21. Max Abrahms, "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," *International Security,* 31 (Fall 2006), 42–78; cf. Erica Chenoweth, Nicholas Miller, Elizabeth McClellan, Hillel Frisch, Paul Staniland, and Max Abrahms, "What Makes Terrorists Tick," *International Security,* 33 (Spring 2009), 180–202.

22. Carlos Pestana Barros and Isabel Proenca, "Mixed Logit Estimation of Radical Islamic Terrorism in Europe and North America: A Comparative Study," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49 (April 2005), 298–314; Mario Ferrero. "Martyrdom Contracts," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 50 (December 2006), 855–77.

23. Victor H. Asal, Karl Rethemeyer, Ian Anderson, Allyson Stein, Jeffrey Rizo, and Matthew Rozea, "The Softest of Targets: A Study on Terrorist Target Selection," *Journal of Applied Security Research,* 4 (2009), 258–78.

24. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Culvert Jones, "Assessing the Dangers of Illicit Networks: Why Al-Qaida May Be Less Threatening Than Many Think," *International Security*, 33 (Fall 2008), 7–44; Scott Helfstein and Dominick Wright, "Covert or Convenient? Evolution of Terror Attack Networks," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 55 (October 2011), 785–813; Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring Terrorism: It Can Be Done," *International Security,* 30 (Winter 2005/6), 87–123.

25. Jacob N. Shapiro and David A. Siegel, "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations," *International Studies Quarterly,* 51 (June 2007), 405–29.

26. We build on studies of terrorist target selection. See Charles J.M. Drake, *Terrorists' Target Selection* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998a); Charles J.M. Drake, "The Role of Ideology in Terrorists' Target Selection," *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 10 (December 1998b), 53–85; Martin Libicki, Peter Chalk, and Melanie Sisson, *Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007); Patrick Brandt and Todd Sandler, "What Do Transnational Terrorists Target? Has It Changed? Are We Safer?," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 54 (April 2010), 214–36; Peter Toft, Arash Duero, and Arunas Bieliauskas, «Terrorist Targeting and Energy Security," *Energy Policy,* 38 (August 2010), 4411–21.

27. Ranya Ahmed, "Terrorist Ideologies and Target Selection," *Journal of Applied Security Research,* 13 (May 2018), 376–90; Drake, 1998b. Gus Martin considers soft targets as places where "a large number of civilians gather as well as military targets that generally are not on alert (passive), and not likely to offer confrontation." Gus Martin, *Understanding Terrorism* (Thousand Oaks: Sage Publishing, 2013), 1. Roughly 70 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide since 1968 have been against soft targets, and the trend has apparently increased over time. Both practitioners and scholars of terrorism have suggested that terrorists tend to attack the most vulnerable, "soft" targets. Quoted in Mia Bloom, *Dying to Kill: The Allure of Suicide Terror* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005). When authorities harden previously attacked targets, terrorists pursue less protected ones ("the substitution effect").

28. James J.F. Forest, *Homeland Security: Protecting America's Targets* (London: Greenwood, 2006), 39–41; Glenn P. McGovern, "Securitization After Terror," in Margaret Beare, ed., *Encyclopedia of Transnational Crime and Justice* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2012), 371.

29. While Salafis and jihadis usually share the common theological tenets of Salafism, they may differ in their approach to the nature of armed jihad, or jihad by sword (*jihad bissaif*), as a duty for Muslims. Jihadis usually consider it a duty for Muslims, while Salafis may differ in their attitude. Therefore, some observers differentiate between moderate and militant Salafism, and place jihadis in the latter category. In practice, the term jihadi is commonly used to designate those involved in armed struggle; Salafi—to denote a puritanical theological interpretation of Islam.

30. Alexander Knysh, "Contextualizing the Salafi-Sufi Conflict (from the Northern Caucasus to Hadramawt)," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 43 (July 2007), 503–30; Gabriel R. Warburg, "From Sufism to Fundamentalism: The Mahdiyya and the Wahhabiyya," *Middle Eastern Studies*, 45 (July 2009), 661–72.

31. Often jihad is understood as an offensive military struggle for the sake of expanding the realm of Islam at the expense of the non-Islamic world (*dar al-harb*), and less frequently as a struggle for individual self-improvement (the greater jihad or *jihad al-akbar*) or as a defensive war through military struggle (*jihad al-asghar*) for the sake of the liberation of Islamic lands (*dar al-islam*). See Shiraz Maher, *Salafi-Jihadism: The History of an Idea*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 31–70; Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Inside Jihadism: Understanding Jihadi Movements Worldwide* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2015).

32. The collection of teachings and practices ascribed to the life of Prophet Muhammad.

33. Some other practices are deemed *haram* for Salafis, including abiding by the principles of liberal democracy, or implementing secular—and thus non-Islamic—laws.

34. Gus Martin, *Essentials of Terrorism: Concepts and Controversies* (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2014), 122.

35. Ibid.; In their typology of terrorist targets, Newman and Clarke as well as Drake designate such targets as iconic and symbolic in that they are representative of a target group's identity and strength. The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the failed attack on the White House are illustrative of the desire to shake the symbolic economic, military, and political foundations of American power. See Ronald Clarke and Graeme Newman, *Policing Terrorism: An Executive's Guide*, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) (Rockville: National Criminal Justice Reference Service, 2008); Drake, 1998a, 10–11; Brigitte L. Nacos, "The Terrorist Calculus behind 9/11: A Model for Future Terrorism," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,* 26 (2013), 1–16.

36. Bruce Hoffman, *Inside Terrorism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 17.

37. Drake, 1998b; Teun van Dongen, "The Lengths Terrorists Go to: Perpetrator Characteristics and the Complexity of Jihadist Terror Attacks in Europe, 2004–2011," *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression,* 6 (January 2014), 58–80; Drake, 1998a; Lisa McCartan, Andrea Masselli, Michael Rey, and Danielle Rusnak, "The Logic of Terrorist Target Choice: An Examination of Chechen Rebel Bombings from 1997–2003," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 31 (January 2008), 60–79. Focusing on ETA, de la Calle and Sánchez-Cuence demonstrate that ethno-separatist terrorists are materially constrained by the resources they have, and ideologically inhibited by the preferences of their supporters. Luis De la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca, "La selección de víctimas en ETA," *Revista Española de Ciencia Política,* 10 (April 2004), 53–79. Clarke and Newman suggest terrorists select targets that elicit positive reactions from sympathizers/followers.

38. Asal et al. Ideologies serve as guides for target selection by rationalizing terrorist violence. For rational actor models of terrorism, see Dwight R. Lee, "Free Riding and Paid Riding in the Fight Against Terrorism," *The American Economic Review,* 78 (1998), 22–26; Todd Sandler and Walter Enders, *An Economic Perspective on Transnational Terrorism* (2002), https://www.diw.de/sixcms/detail.php/39116, accessed February 20, 2015; David Lake, "Rational Extremism: Understanding Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century," *Dialog-IO*, 1 (Spring 2002), 15–29; Eli Berman and David Laitin, "Hard Targets: Theory and Evidence on Suicide Attacks," *NBER Working Paper,* No. 11740 (November 2005), https://econpapers.repec.org/scripts/redir.pf?u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nber.org%2Fpapers%2Fw11740.pdf;h=repec:nbr:nberwo:11740; Todd Sandler, John Tschirhart, and Jon Cauley, "A Theoretical Analysis of Transnational Terrorism," *American Political Science Review,* 77 (March 1983), 36–54. Some scholars have questioned the worldly rationality of religious terrorists. See Jacob N. Shapiro and David A. Siegel, "Underfunding in Terrorist Organizations," in Nasrullah Memon, Jonathan David Farley, David L. Hicks, and Torben Rosenorn, eds., *Mathematical Methods in Counterterrorism* (New York: Springer, 2009).

39. Drake, 1998b; Simon Perry and Badi Hasisi, "Rational Choice Rewards and the Jihadist Suicide Bomber," *Criminological Theory and Terrorism*, 27 (January 2015), 53–80; Daniel S. Gressang, "Audience and Message: Assessing Terrorist WMD Potential," *Terrorism & Political Violence,* 13 (Summer 2001), 83.

40. Mark Juergensmeyer, *Terror in the Mind of God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence* (Oakland: University of California Press, 2003).

41. Daniel P. Hepworth, "Analysis of Al-Qaeda Terrorist Attacks to Investigate Rational Action," *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 7 (2013), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/253/html. On the

role of political theology in conflict, see John D. Carlson and Jonathan H. Ebel, eds., *From Jeremiad to Jihad: Religion, Violence, and America* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Bruce Lincoln, *Holy Terrors. Thinking about Religion after 9/11* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003); Daniel Philpott, "Explaining the Political Ambivalence of Religion," *American Political Science Review*, 101 (August 2007), 505–26.

42. See later discussion of Gubden jamaat.

43. While the total number of haram targets is not known, we recognize that there is a chance of there being an unequal distribution of haram targets, which would influence the extent of haram targeting. This is an important topic for future research.

44. According to Abrahms, 2006 (p. 56), terrorist attacks are a "coercive instrument intended to communicate to target[s]… the costs of noncompliance with their policy demands, while simultaneously seeking to undermine the resolve of the target.

45. Alex Schmid, "Terrorism as Psychological Warfare," *Democracy and Security*, 1 (2005), 137–46.

46. Devorah Manekin, *Regular Soldiers, Irregular War: Violence and Restraint in the Second Intifada* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020).

47. Max Abrahms and Philip Potter, "Explaining Terrorism: Leadership Deficits and Militant Group Tactics," *International Organization,* 69 (Spring 2015), 311–42.

48. Interview with "Daud." Carrying out these less-challenging attacks at the onset of their careers provides fresh jihadis a sense of purpose as well as confidence in their own skills, while binding them to the larger group. Just as an attack on a haram target cements the sense of godly purpose and group solidarity among group members, it also boosts the perpetrator's reputation outwardly vis-a-vis other jihadi groups. As a result, Jihadis are usually quick to broadcast successful targeting of haram entities on their webpages, since conducting attacks against symbols of non-Islamic values boosts a jihadi group's reputation within the Salafi-jihadi community by demonstrating their commitment to the common cause.

49. Authors' interview with Akhmet Yarlykapov, July 26, 2020.

50. Many of these attacks were part of initial rituals for new recruits to lock in complicity. Available literature corroborates these findings. See, for example, Emil A. Souleimanov, "Making Jihad or Making Money? Understanding the Transformation of Dagestan's *Jamaats* into Organised Crime Groups," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 41 (2018), 604–28. It is important to notice that jamaat leaders routinely deployed the custom of initiation violence: fresh recruits were tasked with attacks on law enforcement, which were recorded, putting jihadist "foot soldiers" in blackmailed positions and thus critically increasing their dependence on jamaat leaders. Authors' interview with Irina Gordiyenko, a reputable Russian journalist covering Dagestan, June 2014.

51. In the discussion of Dagestan, we also consider urban-rural cleavages as an explanation, and, in the global statistical analysis, we consider the rebel group's age and strength.

52. On ethnicity, ethnic politics, and collective action, see Henry Hale, *The Foundation of Ethnic Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

53. *Jamaat* is a term for jihadi groups widely used throughout Russia's North Caucasus and in the post-Soviet republics, but is used here to refer to Salafi jihadi groups generally.

54. In contemporary Dagestan as elsewhere in the North Caucasus, jamaat is a term commonly used to designate local jihadi groups.

55. This appeal marked the start of a campaign of haram attacks across Dagestan. Quoted in Emil Souleimanov, "Dagestan's Jihadists and Haram Targeting," *Central Asian and Caucasus Analyst*, 17 (February 2015), 10–13. Leaflets available upon request from authors.

56. During the same period, the GTD (Global Terrorism Database) indicates that there were 386 terrorist attacks in Dagestan, which suggests that attacks against haram targets represent about 10 percent of all attacks.

57. In cases where our informants contradicted each other regarding the jamaat responsible for the attack, we contacted additional informants for more information to arrive at a final coding.

58. Former and current jihadis, as well as the officer of the Dagestani Ministry of Interior, consented to be interviewed on the grounds of strict confidentiality. Their identities are therefore concealed in this study, whereas the identities of scholars and journalists are disclosed.

59. This holds specifically for (ethnically homogenous) jihadi groups operating in rural areas, while jihadi groups operating in urban centers are more often ethnically mixed. Emil Aslan Souleimanov, "A Perfect Umma?," *Ethnicities*, 18 (March 2018), 434–53.

60. Interview with Professor Akhmet Yarlykapov of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, January 30, 2015. Akhmet Yarlykapov observed that virtually everybody is someone's relative in the rural areas, so those who went to the woods [joined jamaats] are not eager to liquidate their relatives in the local administration and police (or haram attacks). The instances of killing relatives became notorious just because they were so rare.

61. Olga Tsapieva and Tagir Muslimov, "Etnopoliticheskaya i etnosocialnaya situatsiya v Dagestane i noveyshie konflikty," *Rossiya i musulmanskiy mir*, 3 (2007), https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/etnopoliticheska-ya-i-etnosotsialnaya-situatsiya-v-respublike-dagestan-i-noveyshie-konflikty/viewer.

62. Although clan and nationalism constitute essentially non-Islamic cleavages, known by the derogatory term of *asabiyya* (tribalism or nationalism), which are contrasted to the highly revered concept of *umma*, the one Islamic nation, religious, ethnic, and *tukhum* loyalties are intertwined in Dagestani society. Virginie Collombier and Olivier Roy, eds., *Tribes and Global Jihadism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

63. Tekushev, "Triumph of the Caucasus Emirate," CSIS, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/120217_Hahn_IIPER_52.pdf. A similar observation holds for Chechen Salafis, culturally proximate to their Dagestani neighbors.

64. Interview with "Sultan."

65. Some of the most well-known mono-ethnic jamaats include the Gubdenskiy, the Karabudakhkentskiy, the Tsumadinskiy, and the Sergokalinskiy jamaats.

66. Some of the most well-known multi-ethnic jamaats include the Sharia, the Khasavyurtovskiy, the Shamilkalinskiy (Makhachkala), the Derbentskiy, the Buynakskiy, the Kizlyarskiy, and Southern (Yuzhniy) jamaats.

67. Interview with "Idris."

68. Aslan Souleimanov, 2018.

69. Interview with "Akhmed".

70. Interview with "Daud."

71. Interview with "Said."

72. Interview with "Nurmagomed."

73. Interview with "Akhmed."

74. Interview with "Akhmed."

75. Interview with "Abdulla."

76. Interview with "Abdul."

77. Ware and Kisriev; Souleimanov, 2018.

78. Souleimanov, 2018.

79. Haram targeting in Dagestan was most often used as an "educative" and non-lethal tactic rather than a punishing one. The reason behind this decision is the potential cost associated with haram targeting such as the risk to antagonize local supporters as well as the cost of targeting hard targets for identity-based purpose resulting in severe retaliation at the hands of law enforcement. Although the cost-benefit analysis is not part of our argument, it is central to take into consideration to understand why jamaats opted for non-lethal haram targeting to resolve their collective action problem.

80. We thank a reviewer for noting an interesting parallel with the use of sexual violence as an initiation strategy for new recruits, which we mention in the conclusion. See Dara Cohen, *Sexual Violence in Civil War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).

81. Such statements were often made throughout our fieldwork in rural Dagestani villages. Our interviewees discussed about the religious fervor of rural jamaats' fighters including the Gubden jamaat and their dedication to what is described as a purified form of Islam.

82. Magomedali Vagabov, leader of the Gudben jamaat in 2010, launched a series of suicide attacks in Dagestan and across Russia, including in the Moscow Metro. See, Gordon Hahn, *The Caucasus Emirate Mujahideen: Global Jihadism in Russia's North Caucasus and Beyond* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2014).

83. Although the majority of mono-ethnic jamaats in our dataset waged insurgent warfare across urban areas in the republic, only one of those mono-ethnic jamaats*,* the Endireyskaya jamaat, engaged in any significant amount of haram targeting. The Endireyskaya jamaat is composed of Kumyk fighters who are active in Khasavyurt and Kizilyur, as well as their surrounding rural areas, and committed five minor attacks against haram targets in urban areas (with no casualties). Although the jamaat engaged in five haram attacks, the vast majority of their other attacks targeted police forces, state representatives, and religious figures. Moreover, based on a discussion with an MVD officer in Dagestan, we learned that these attacks were done in partnership with a multi-ethnic *jamaat*.

84. Interview with "Sultan."

85. Our interviewees, however, emphasized that strangers were not welcome in tight-knit rural jamaats.

86. We consulted the BAAD database as well as the External Actor Conflict Dataset (EACD) to identify a total of 119 Islamic militant groups that have operated in the period 1998–2015. We then drew extensively on Jones (2014, 2018), Crenshaw (2013), and several online books and reports to code Salafi/Deobandi groups. We also added ten Dagestani outfits to arrive at a total of 142 Islamist militant groups. Next, we collected the

data on terrorist attacks for all these groups using the GTD. We filtered these attacks by selecting "soft targets," including businesses (restaurants, bars, cafes, retail stores, bakeries, hotels, and resorts), religious institutions, educational institutions, international NGOs, beach, museums, cultural centers, cultural houses, tourism travel agencies, and tourist sites. We then examined the news related to every attack using the sources reported in the GTD. Those attacks that had a clearly stated haram motive were coded 1 while those with no motive or instrumental motive were coded 0. Importantly, many haram attacks were committed by unknown perpetrators according to GTD. Given the lack of the identity of the group, we did not include these instances in our dataset.

87. Most of the attacks in our data targeted girls' schools in Afghanistan, Dagestan, and Pakistan (114), followed by convenience/grocery stores (23), music shops (10), liquor stores (9), Sufi shrines (9), cafes (7), mausoleums and tombs (4), restaurants (4), brothels (3), cinemas (3), barber shops (2), resorts (2), Shia mosques (2), a health center (1), van with textbooks (1), a livestock fodder manufacturer (1), nightclub (1), and a film studio (1). Three groups—Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) in Pakistan, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Daesh in Iraq and Syria, and Boko Haram in Nigeria—were responsible for the bulk of these attacks.

88. To code the ethnic composition of jihadi groups, we relied heavily on Crenshaw, militant profiles portals (Global Security and Tracking Terrorism), as well as online news.

89. Given that there is no available dataset on ethnic composition of terrorist groups, we often had to rely on anecdotal evidence, but our categories are also very coarse.

90. Brenda Shaffer, *The Limits of Culture: Islam and Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006), 277.

91. Marta Crenshaw, 2013. Mapping Militant Organizations, source: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/105, accessed on March 12, 2019.

92. The Taliban and TTP haram attacks are largely focused on girl schools, which suggests a strategy of deterrence from modernization through fear. Other groups engaged in haram as a form of blackmail or taxation. While this falls outside of the scope of our article, it is open for further research.

93. Bruce Hoffman, "Terrorism Trends and Prospects," in Ian Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, eds., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1999), 7–13.

94. We use the age of militant groups from the BAAD database: the number of years in existence as of 2015.

95. Lisa Hultman, "Battle Losses and Rebel Violence: Raising the Costs for Fighting," *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 19 (April 2007), 205–22; Reed Wood, "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians," *Journal of Peace Research,* 47 (September 2010), 601–14; Idean Salehyan, David Siroky, and Reed Wood, "External Rebel Sponsorship and Civilian Abuse," *International Organization,* 68 (Summer 2014), 633–61.

96. Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer, "The Nature of the Beast: Organizational Structures and the Lethality of Terrorist Attacks," *The Journal of Politics,* 70 (April 2008), 437–49.

97. Bloom; Andrew Kydd and Barbara Walter, "The Strategies of Terrorism," *International Security,* 31 (Summer 2006), 49–80.

98. Megan Farrell, "The Logic of Transnational Outbidding," *Journal of Peace Research,* 57 (May 2020), 437–51.

99. We measure this using the size interval of the organization's membership from the BAAD database. This covariate ranges from 0 (up to 100 members) to 1 (100–1,000 members) to 2 (1,000–10,000 members) and 3 (over 10,000 members). This variable is labeled "ordsize" in the BAAD database. We transform this categorical measure into binary variable with 1, 2, and 3 treated as strong militants, or 1, and weak militants, or 0.

100. Cohen.

# APPENDIX

**Table A1**  Data on all known *Haram* Attacks in Dagestan between May 17, 2010, to December 27, 2014

| Jamaat | Ethnicity | Attacks |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Aknada | Mixed | 1 |
| Akushinskaya | Mixed | 1 |
| Ashaga-Stalskaya/Suleyman-Stalsaya | Mixed | 2 |
| Azerbaijan | Mixed | 0 |
| Babayurtovskiy | Mono | 1 |
| Bavtugayskaya | Mixed | 1 |
| Buynakskiy | Mixed | 3 |
| Derbentskiy | Mixed | 3 |
| Endireyskaya | Mono | 5 |
| Gagarina | Mixed | 1 |
| Gergebilskiy | Mono | 1 |
| Gubdenskiy | Mono | 0 |
| Izberbashskiy | Mixed | 0 |
| Kadar-Karamakhi | Mixed | 0 |
| Karabudakhkentskiy | Mono | 1 |
| Karatinskaya | Mono | 1 |
| Khasavyurtovskiy | Mixed | 3 |
| Kizilyurtovsky | Mixed | 0 |
| Kizlyarskiy | Mixed | 0 |
| Kumtarkalin | Mono | 0 |
| Levashinskiy | Mono | 0 |
| Makhachkala | Mixed | 4 |
| Malo-Areshevskaya | Mixed | 1 |
| Nogayskiy | Mono | 0 |
| R. Israpilova | Mixed | 4 |
| Reduktornaya | Mixed | 1 |
| Sergokalinskiy | Mono | 0 |
| Shamilkala | Mixed | 4 |
| Shamilkala-Kaspiisk sector | Mixed | 0 |
| Shariat | Mixed | 0 |
| Sovetskaya | Mixed | 2 |
| Sulaskaya | Mixed | 1 |
| Tavakkul | Mono | 0 |
| Tsumada, Botlikh, and Tsuntin (Tsumadinskiy) | Mono | 0 |
| ul. Yaragskogo/Kotrova | Mixed | 1 |
| Yuzhniy | Mixed | 0 |

**Table A2**   Data on all known *Haram* Attacks on the Global Scale (1998–2015)

| Group | Ethnicity | Attacks |
|---|---|---|
| Abu Bakr al-SiddiqFundamentalistBrigades | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Adan-Abyan Province of the Islamic State | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Adan Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) | Multi-ethnic | 2 |
| Aknada | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| Akushinskaya | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| al-Ahwal Brigades | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| al-Arifeen | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| al-Badr | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (GAI) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| al-Haramayn Brigades | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| al-Ittihaad al-Islami (AIAI) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Al-Mua'qi'oonBiddam Brigade | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| al-Qaeda | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| al-Qaeda in Aceh | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| al-Qaeda in Iraq | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penninsula (AQAP) | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| al-Shabaab | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Ansar al-Dine | Mono-ethnic | 3 |
| Ansar al-Furqan | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Ansar al-Islam | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Ansar al-Jihad | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Ansar al-Sharia | Mono-ethnic | 1 |
| Ansar al-Sharia | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Ansar al-Sunnah Army | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Ansaru | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Armed Islamic Group (GIA) | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| ARS/UIC | Mono-ethnic | 1 |
| Asbat al-Ansar | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Ashaga-Stalskaya/Suleyman-Stalsaya | Multi-ethnic | 2 |
| Azerbaijan | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Babayurtovskiy | Mono-ethnic | 1 |
| Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Battalion of the Martyr Abdullah Azzam | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| Bavtugayskaya | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| Boko Haram | Mono-ethnic | 4 |
| Buynakskiy | Multi-ethnic | 3 |
| Derbentskiy | Multi-ethnic | 3 |
| East Turkistan Islamic Organization | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| East Turkistan Liberation Organization | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Endireyskaya | Mono-ethnic | 5 |

**Table A2**  (continued)

| Group | Ethnicity | Attacks |
|---|---|---|
| Gagarina | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| Gergebilskiy | Mono-ethnic | 1 |
| Gubdenskiy | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Harakat al-Shuhada'a al-Islamiyah | NA | 0 |
| Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HuM) | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Hizbul-Islam | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Islamic Jihad Brigades | NA | 0 |
| Islamic Jihad Group (JIG) | NA | 0 |
| Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Islamic ShashantantraAndolon (ISA) | Mono-ethnic | 2 |
| Islamic State in Lybia | Multi-ethnic | 3 |
| Islamic State in Somalia | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) | Multi-ethnic | 6 |
| Izberbashskiy | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Jabhat al-Nusra | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Jaish al-Adl | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansura | NA | 0 |
| Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Jamaat-ul-Ahrar | Multi-ethnic | 2 |
| Jamaat Ansarullah | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JuM) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Jaysh al-Islam | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Jaysh Al-Muhajirin Wal-Ansar | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Jemaah Islamiya (JI) | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Jund al-Aqsa | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Jund al-Sham | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Jundallah | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Jundullah | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Kadar-Karamakhi | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Karabudakhkentskiy | Mono-ethnic | 1 |
| Karatinskaya | Mono-ethnic | 1 |
| Khasavyurtovskiy | Multi-ethnic | 3 |
| Khorasan Chapter of the Islamic State | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| Kizilyurtovsky | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Kizlyarskiy | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Kumtarkalin | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Lashkar-e-Islam (Pakistan) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Lashkar-I-Omar | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Laskar Jihad | Mono-ethnic | 0 |

(*Continued*)

**Table A2** (continued)

| Group | Ethnicity | Attacks |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Levashinskiy | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Libyan Islamic Fighting Group | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Makhachkala | Multi-ethnic | 4 |
| Malo-Areshevskaya | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| Mujahideen KOMPAK | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| MUJAO | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| Nogayskiy | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| People's United Liberation Front (PULF) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| R. Israpilova | Multi-ethnic | 4 |
| Reduktornaya | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| SalafiaJihadia | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Salafist Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Sergokalinskiy | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Shamilkala | Multi-ethnic | 4 |
| Shamilkala-Kaspiisk sector | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Shariat | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Sovetskaya | Multi-ethnic | 2 |
| Special Purpose Islamic Regiment | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Sulaskaya | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| Taliban | Mono-ethnic | 47 |
| Tavakkul | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Tawhid and Jihad | Multi-ethnic | 0 |
| Tehreek Nifaz-e-ShariatMohammadi (TNSM) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| Tehrik-i-Taliban (TTP) | Multi-ethnic | 79 |
| Tsumada, Botlikh, and Tsuntin (Tsumadinskiy) | Mono-ethnic | 0 |
| ul. Yaragskogo/Kotrova | Multi-ethnic | 1 |
| Yuzhniy | Multi-ethnic | 0 |